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HEALTH - MALPRACTICE, NEGLIGENCE, OR BREACH OF 
DUTY: THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT HOLDS 
THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF A SURGERY OTHER THAN 
THE ONE IDENTIFIED ON A CONSENT FORM DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN OBVIOUS OCCURRENCE OF 
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
Cartwright v. Tong, 2017 ND 146, 896 N.W.2d 638. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Cartwright v. Tong, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the 
performance of a surgery different than the one consented to was not an “ob-
vious occurrence” of negligence within the meaning of North Dakota Century 
Code Section 28-01-46, and therefore, was not exempt from the statute’s re-
quirement to provide expert opinion within three months of commencing a 
medical malpractice suit.  The Defendant, Dr. Beverly Tong, removed Plain-
tiff Roxane Cartwright’s fallopian tubes, rather than performing the tubal li-
gation Cartwright had consented to.  The North Dakota Supreme Court found 
that the occurrence was not obvious because the case involved technical pro-
cedures that the average person did not understand, and it was not clear what 
had led Tong to perform the different procedure.  The Dissent criticized the 
majority’s holding, arguing that the obvious occurrence exception did apply.  
In this case, there were conflicting opinions over what the “occurrence” was, 
which exposes how detrimental this basic determination is for a plaintiff 
wanting to claim that such occurrence is obvious.  Further, the broad appli-
cation of the technical procedure guideline in this case raises the problems 
with employing such a rule without an analysis separating the technical issues 
from the ordinary fact questions.  Overall, Cartwright exposes a need for 
more analytical guidelines that would aid attorneys in accurately determining 
whether their cases have the ability to progress past the early stages of litiga-
tion without expert testimony.   
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I. FACTS 
Throughout her fourth pregnancy, twenty-nine-year-old Roxane Cart-
wright (“Cartwright”) met with her doctor, Beverly Tong (“Tong”), to dis-
cuss options for post-partum contraception.1 Initially interested in an intrau-
terine device (IUD), Cartwright ultimately decided on tubal ligation based on 
her discussions with Tong.2  Cartwright said that Tong had also referred to a 
new procedure called a bilateral salpingectomy, in which the fallopian tubes 
were removed instead of “tied.”3  According to Cartwright4, she stressed that 
she did not want her fallopian tubes removed because she wanted to have the 
option of reversal that came with the tubal ligation procedure.5  The hospital’s 
procedure records noted that Cartwright desired, and was approved for, tubal 
ligation on November 23, 2011.6  Cartwright apparently authorized and con-
sented to a “Caesarean delivery with tubal ligation” on May 7, 2012.7  Tong’s 
notes from May 7, 2012, found in Cartwright’s medical records, indicated 
she discussed the risks of tubal ligation with Cartwright.8  
On May 16, 2012, Tong performed a Caesarean delivery, followed by a 
bilateral salpingectomy, in which she removed Cartwright’s fallopian tubes.9 
Procedure notes from that time state, “Presents for repeat Cesarean section 
with bilateral tubal ligation.  The risks of tubal ligation include risk of failure 
of 3 to 7/1,000, however is lower for this salpingectomy . . . understanding 
all these issues, she does desire to proceed.”10  Medical records further re-
ferred to both “completion of the tubal ligation” and “completion of the sal-
pingectomy.”11  The records additionally noted there were not any complica-
tions.12  Tong did not allege she had a medical reason to perform a different 
 
1. Brief of Appellants at ¶¶ 8, 17, Cartwright v. Tong, 2017 ND 146, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 
20160293), 2017 WL 749300.  
2. Id. at ¶ 8.  
3. Id. at ¶ 9.  
4. It is not clear whether Cartwright’s allegations are undisputed. Cartwright’s attorney said 
the facts were undisputed in the sense that they were not met with additional admissible evidence 
to overcome the allegations. Oral Argument at 17:09, 19:00, Cartwright, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 
20160293), http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/docket/20160293.htm. 
5. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 9. 
6. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. 
7. Id. at ¶ 8; see also Appellee Brief at ¶ 7, Cartwright v. Tong, 2017 ND 146, 896 N.W.2d 
638 (No. 20160293), 2017 WL 749300.  
8. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11. 
9. Id.; see also Appellee Brief, supra note 7, at ¶ 7.  
10. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11.  
11. Cartwright v. Tong, 2017 ND 146, ¶ 28, 896 N.W.2d 638, 645. 
12. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11. 
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procedure.13  Following the procedure, the facts appear to show that Cart-
wright was never informed that a different procedure had been performed.14 
In the next two years, Roxane and her husband, Tim, worked to adopt a 
daughter from the Marshall Islands.15  Because the process was going slowly, 
Roxane made an appointment with Dr. Tong to discuss tubal ligation rever-
sal.16  Allegedly, it was at that appointment, in February 2014, when Roxane 
first found out that her fallopian tubes had been removed almost two years 
earlier.17  On May 8, 2014, Roxane and Tim Cartwright sued Dr. Tong and 
Great Plains Women’s Health Center, P.C., for professional negligence.18  
They alleged that Dr. Tong negligently expanded the scope of Roxane Cart-
wright’s consent19 by performing a different surgery than Roxane had origi-
nally consented to.20  The defendants denied liability and later moved to dis-
miss the action based on the Cartwrights’ failure to provide expert testimony 
establishing a prima facie case for medical negligence within three months 
of commencing the action, as required by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.21  In the al-
ternative, defendants made a motion for summary judgment.22  The district 
court did not address the issue of obvious occurrence.23  Rather, the court 
sided with Tong and Great Plains, and entered a judgment dismissing the 
Cartwrights’ complaint.24  The Cartwrights appealed25 to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, which affirmed.26 
 
 
13. Cartwright, ¶ 36, 896 N.W.2d at 647. 
14. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11; see also Appellee Brief, supra note 7, at ¶ 8.  
15. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11; see also Cartwright, ¶ 3, 896 N.W.2d at 640. 
16. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11; see also Cartwright, ¶ 3. 
17. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 11; see also Cartwright, ¶ 3. 
18. Cartwright, ¶ 2, 896 N.W.2d at 640. 
19. The Court noted this case could have been analyzed as a “medical battery case” due to the 
allegation of a “total lack of consent,” but analyzed the case as negligence because the Cartwrights 
asserted negligence. Id. at ¶ 36, 896 N.W.2d at 647 n.1. 
20. Id. ¶ 14 n.1. 
21. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 3. 
22. Cartwright, ¶ 4, 896 N.W.2d at 640-641. 
23. Id. ¶ 11, 896 N.W.2d at 642. 
24. Id. 
25. Although a dismissal without prejudice cannot usually be appealed, such dismissals may 
be appealable “if the plaintiff cannot cure the defect that led to the dismissal, or if the dismissal has 
the practical effect of terminating the litigation in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.” Here, the Court 
found that Roxane Cartwright could appeal the decision because the statute of limitations had run, 
effectually precluding any future action. Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 896 N.W.2d at 641 (quoting Rodenburg v. 
Fargo-Moorhead YMCA, 2001 ND 139, ¶ 13, 632 N.W.2d 407, 413). 
26. Id. ¶ 23, 896 N.W.2d at 645. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In North Dakota, plaintiffs alleging professional negligence are required 
to produce an expert opinion affidavit supporting a prima facie case of their 
claim within three months of commencing the action.27  This requirement is 
codified by North Dakota Century Code § 28-01-46, which requires dismissal 
where the plaintiff fails to do so.28  Nonetheless, plaintiffs are not required to 
obtain such affidavits where the case involves an “obvious occurrence.”29  
The crucial question, therefore, is what constitutes an “obvious occurrence.” 
A. OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE OBVIOUS 
OCCURRENCE EXCEPTION 
Actions for “ordinary negligence” can be established and understood 
through “common everyday experience.”30  Medical malpractice deviates 
from ordinary negligence when the act complained of involves a “science or 
art requiring special skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons.”31  Gen-
erally, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice by 
providing expert testimony demonstrating the standard of care, breach of that 
standard of care, and that the breach caused the injury complained of.32  Sec-
tion 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century Code requires a plaintiff alleging 
medical malpractice to provide this expert opinion very early in the lawsuit.33  
The statute states, in relevant part: 
 
Any action for injury or death alleging professional negligence by a 
physician, nurse, hospital…or by any other health care organiza-
tion…must be dismissed without prejudice on motion unless the 
plaintiff serves upon the defendant an affidavit containing an admis-
sible expert opinion to support a prima facie case of professional 
negligence within three months of the commencement of the ac-
tion.34 
 
 
27. Id. ¶ 10, 896 N.W.2d at 642. 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  
30. Sime v. Tvenge Assocs. Architects & Planners, P.C., 488 N.W.2d 606, 609 (N.D. 1992). 
31. Id. (quoting Berger v. State, 171 A.D.2d 713, 717 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)). 
32. Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 583 (N.D. 1979). 
33. STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 5:5.60 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2017). 
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2017). 
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However, the statute also provides exceptions by listing the occurrences 
for which an expert opinion affidavit will not be required.  These include 
unintentional failure to remove a foreign substance from within the body of 
a patient, or performance of a medical procedure upon the wrong patient, 
organ, limb, or other part of the patient’s body, or other obvious occurrence.35 
The explicit exceptions—failure to remove a foreign substance and per-
formance of a medical procedure on the wrong patient, organ, limb, or other 
part of the body—should seem familiar to first-year Torts students, as they 
are classic examples of res ipsa loquitur.36  The more difficult language to 
decipher is “other obvious occurrence.”  To understand the “obvious occur-
rence” provision, it is necessary to consider the context in which such expert 
affidavit statutes arose, the relationship of the statute to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, and modern methods of analysis used by the North Dakota Su-
preme Court. 
B. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 AND OTHER EXPERT AFFIDAVIT STATUTES 
In the mid-1970s, the amount of medical malpractice lawsuits soared, 
eventually causing many state legislatures to enact statutory provisions de-
signed to reduce liability and expedite the judicial process for medical mal-
practice cases.37  Jurisdictions took different approaches, such as creating 
statutes of limitations for medical malpractice, requiring arbitration or review 
panels prior to trial, and limiting possible recovery amounts and contingent 
fees.38  Some jurisdictions enacted statutes requiring an expert affidavit of 
merit in order to maintain medical malpractice suits.39  In many of the juris-
dictions enacting such statutes, there is a question as to whether the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur precludes a plaintiff from having to comply with the re-
quirements of the statute.40  
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Id. 
36. SPEISER, supra note 33. 
37. Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, When Patient Claims Against Doctor, Hospital, or 
Similar Health Care Provider are not Subject to Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Dam-
ages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R. 4th 887 (1991). 
38. Id. 
39. 54 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 142 (2017).  
40. SPEISER, supra note 33. 
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1. Relationship Between Res Ipsa Loquitur and the “Obvious 
Occurrence” in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 
In 1981, the North Dakota Legislature passed its own version of the “af-
fidavit of merit” statute: N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.41  The statute itself “provides 
examples of obvious occurrences of negligence . . . . that trigger res ipsa lo-
quitur.”42  These include the “unintentional failure to remove a foreign sub-
stance”; medical procedures done on the wrong patient, organ, limb, or other 
body part; “or other obvious occurrence.”43  Through this provision, the 
North Dakota Legislature defined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with re-
gards to medical malpractice cases.44 
The courts have chosen to interpret the catch-all phrase “or other obvious 
occurrence” narrowly.45  In Larsen v. Zarrett, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when general words follow spe-
cific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are con-
strued to embrace only objects in nature to those objects specifically 
enumerated. The word ‘obvious’ means ‘easily understood; requir-
ing no thought or consideration to understand or analyze; so simple 
and clear as to be unmistakable.’ By enacting § 28-01-46, the Leg-
islature has…given [res ipsa loquitur] a scope which is, perhaps, 
even more narrow than and limited than our case law on the doctrine 
which preceded the statute’s enactment.46 
 
In the same case, the Court found the obvious occurrence exception would 
only apply to cases “plainly within the knowledge of a layperson.”47  
 
41. Fortier v. Traynor, 330 N.W.2d 513, 516 (N.D. 1983). 
42. Strand v. Sanford Health Fargo, No. 09-2014-CV-1738, 2014 WL 11191268, at *4 (D. 
N.D. Sept. 23, 2014) (citing Maguire v. Taylor, 940 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1991)).  
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2017).  
44. SPEISER, supra note 33. For this reason, this comment will refer to “res ipsa loquitur” and 
“exceptions to N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46” or “obvious occurrences,” interchangeably.  
45. Id. 
46. Larsen v. Zarrett, 498 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1993) (citations omitted). 
47. Id. at 195. 
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2. Exceptions to Expert Affidavit Statutes in Other Jurisdictions 
In the United States as a whole, there are various statutes which require 
some sort of expert opinion in medical malpractice cases.48  In fact, over half 
of the states have such statutes.49  Some of these states have strict statutes, 
requiring an expert affidavit without exception.50  In these states, an expert 
affidavit is necessary even where res ipsa loquitur is implicated in the ac-
tion.51  Other states explicitly exempt claims involving res ipsa loquitur from 
their statutes.52  For example, New York’s affidavit of merit statute provides: 
 
(c) Where the attorney intends to rely solely on the doctrine of ‘res 
ipsa loquitur,’ this section shall be inapplicable. In such cases, the 
complaint shall be accompanied by a certificate, executed by the 
attorney, declaring that the attorney is solely relying on such doc-
trine and, for that reason, is not filing a certificate required by this 
section.53 
 
Finally, there are statutes that require expert opinion, but provide excep-
tions using language that resembles res ipsa loquitur.54  North Dakota’s stat-
ute, N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46, falls into this category, and it appears that Dela-
ware is similar.55  Delaware’s statute provides that affidavits of merit: 
 
‘[S]hall be unnecessary if the complaint alleges a rebuttable infer-
ence of medical negligence,’ which arises where the plaintiff pro-
duces evidence showing the injury arose in one of three specific cir-
cumstances: (1) a ‘foreign object was unintentionally left within the 
body of the patient following surgery; (2) [a]n explosion or fire orig-
inating in a substance used in treatment occurred in the course of 
 
48. Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Cer-
tificates of Merit?, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 537, 552 (1997). 
49. Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie Im-
plications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 225 (2010). 
50. SPEISER, supra note 33. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2017); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2004).   
51. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2013); Sherman v. HealthSouth 
Specialty Hosp., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App. 2013) (“the limited liability of res ipsa lo-
quitur in health care liability cases…is not an exception to section 74.351’s expert report require-
ment”).  
52. SPEISER, supra note 33. 
53. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (MCKINNEY 2017). 
54. SPEISER, supra note 33. 
55. Id. 
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treatment; or (3) [a] surgical procedure was performed on the wrong 
patient or the wrong organ, limb or part of the patient’s body.’56  
 
In Delaware, res ipsa loquitur can only be applied in these circumstances 
because the Court has found that the legislature clearly required expert testi-
mony in all medical malpractice cases falling outside of these enumerated 
exceptions.57  Though the Delaware and North Dakota statutes are similar in 
that both narrow the availability of res ipsa loquitur,58 Delaware’s legislature 
chose to state what occurrences were obvious, and did not include any refer-
ence to a possible “other” occurrence.59 
C. MODERN GUIDELINE: CASES INVOLVING TECHNICAL SURGICAL 
PROCEDURES DO NOT INVOLVE OBVIOUS OCCURRENCES 
Expert testimony is not needed in an “obvious occurrence” case because 
the average person can understand negligence has occurred without infor-
mation from an expert.60  In cases involving technical surgical procedures, 
plaintiffs are unable to rely on obvious results following a surgery to invoke 
the obvious occurrence exception.61  Rather, to claim an “obvious occur-
rence,” the plaintiff must show that the occurrence (i.e., the procedure) itself 
was obvious.62  Because technical surgical procedures are generally recog-
nized as being beyond the understanding of laypersons,63 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court has been prone to denying the “obvious occurrence” excep-
tion in cases that involve technical procedures.64  
 
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (2017). 
57. Williams v. Dyer, No. 91C-11-010, 1992 WL 240477, at *2 (Del. Aug. 12, 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
58. Id. at *1; Larsen v. Zarrett, 498 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1993). 
59. It appears that North Dakota is the only expert affidavit statute state with an exception 
using such ‘catch-all’ language. Goldberg Segalla, 50-State Survey of Affidavit of Merit Statutes, 
Professional Liability Matters (Feb. 2015), http://professionalliabilitymatters.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/02/GS-3471935-v3-PL_Matters_AOM_Chart_REVISED.pdf. 
60. Greene v. Matthys, 2017 ND 107, ¶ 13, 893 N.W.2d 179, 183 (citing Larsen, 498 N.W.2d 
at 195)).  
61. Id. ¶ 14, 893 N.W.2d at 184. 
62. Id. 
63. Larsen, 498 N.W.2d at 195 (citing Maguire v. Taylor, 940 F.2d 375, 377 (1991); Lemke 
v. United States, 557 F.Supp. 1205, 1211 (1983)).  
64. See Larsen, 498 N.W.2d 191 (holding that severe pain and numbness following a surgery 
for hemorrhoids and an inguinal hernia involved technical procedures beyond the understanding of 
a layperson); Haugenoe v. Bambrick, 2003 ND 92, 663 N.W.2d 175 (holding that a surgical open 
reduction and internal fixation of the elbow resulting in a misaligned elbow with missing bone frag-
ments was a technical surgical procedure beyond the understanding of a layperson); Greene v. Mat-
thys, 2017 ND 107, 893 N.W.2d 179 (holding that hip surgery resulting in one leg being two inches 
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Nonetheless, there is a difference between technical matters and ordinary 
questions of fact.  The average case of medical malpractice encompasses 
more than just medical and technical issues; they involve ordinary questions 
of fact as well.65  While the purpose of expert testimony is to help laypersons 
understand medical and technical aspects of a case, laypersons can decide 
ordinary fact questions on their own.66  If an expert’s opinion will not be 
helpful in resolving an issue, or it is difficult to determine what such testi-
mony would even consist of, the issue is likely an ordinary question of fact 
that laypersons are capable of resolving.67  
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
In Cartwright, the North Dakota Supreme Court, with Justice Crothers 
writing for the majority, found that the Cartwrights’ claim was “not the type 
of claim that f[ell] within the ‘obvious occurrence’ exception” to N.D.C.C. § 
28-01-46.68  The Court stated that both procedures—tubal ligation and bilat-
eral salpingectomy—were technical surgical procedures not within the 
knowledge of laypersons.69  Moreover, while it may have been obvious that 
a different surgery was performed, it was not obvious what had led to the 
occurrence.70  Because this was not considered a case of “obvious occur-
rence,” the Cartwrights were required to provide expert medical testimony 
within three months to establish a prima facie case of negligence.71  In a con-
curring opinion, Justice McEvers agreed with the majority, specifically not-
ing that Defendant Tong’s Answer to the Cartwrights’ Complaint, along with 
medical records Tong submitted in support of her Answer, referred to “tubal 
ligation” and “salpingectomy” in a manner that made it unclear what the med-
ical terms meant and how the terms were used by medical professionals.72  
The dissent, written by District Judge Herauf, disagreed, arguing that the ob-
vious occurrence “should have been found applicable because it was obvious 
the wrong procedure was performed.”73 
 
longer than the other required expert opinion because hip surgery was a technical surgical procedure 
beyond the understanding of laypersons). 
65. Greenwood v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp. of North Dakota Inc. Corp., 2001 ND 28, ¶ 
16, 622 N.W.2d 195, 200. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 15. 
68. Cartwright v. Tong, 2017 ND 146, ¶ 14, 896 N.W.2d at 643 (Justice Crothers was joined 
by Justices McEvers and Tufte).  
69. Id. at 642. 
70. Id. at 643. 
71. Id. ¶ 17, 896 N.W.2d at 644. 
72. Id. ¶ 28, 896 N.W.2d at 645. 
73. Id. ¶ 33, 896 N.W.2d at 646. 
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Plaintiffs are not required to obtain an expert witness affidavit where the 
professional negligence is an “obvious occurrence.”74  The Court followed 
prior case law by refusing to apply the “obvious occurrence” exception to 
Section 28-01-46, N.D.C.C., where the act complained of involved a tech-
nical surgical procedure.75  The Court analyzed the Cartwrights’ claim both 
as a medical negligence claim and a lack of informed consent claim76 and 
concluded that the “obvious occurrence” exception did not apply “[u]nder 
either theory.”77 
1. Medical Negligence Analysis 
Plaintiffs framed their claim as a medical malpractice case in which Dr. 
Tong “negligently expanded the scope of Roxane Cartwright’s original con-
sent” when she removed Roxane’s fallopian tubes rather than completing the 
bilateral tubal ligation Roxane had originally consented to.78  The Court 
found that the claim, as stated by the Cartwrights, required an expert witness 
“to establish Tong’s applicable standard of care, violation of that standard 
and the causal relationship between the violation and the harm complained 
of.”79  Because it was a technical procedure, the Court decided that an expert 
witness was required to establish the above elements.80 
2. Informed Consent Analysis 
Based on the wording of the Cartwrights’ claim, the defendants argued 
that the plaintiffs’ claim was one of lack of informed consent.81  While the 
doctrine of informed consent is a type of negligence, there are slightly differ-
ent elements required to be established by a plaintiff, which include breach 
of duty of disclosure, causation, and harm.82  Unlike the negligence analysis 
above, it is already an established fact that a physician has a duty “to disclose 
 
74. Cartwright, ¶ 10, 896 N.W.2d at 642. 
75. Id. ¶ 17, 896 N.W.2d at 644. 
76. The Court did note that the claim would be better characterized as “medical battery” due 
to the complete lack of consent, but analyzed it as negligence based on the Cartwrights’ claim. Id. 
¶ 9, 896 N.W.2d at 641 n.1. 
77. Id. ¶ 17, 896 N.W.2d at 644. 
78. Id. ¶ 9, 896 N.W.2d at 641. 
79. Id. ¶ 14, 896 N.W.2d at 643. 
80. Cartwright, ¶14, 896 N.W.2d at 643.  
81. Id. ¶ 9, 896 N.W.2d at 641. 
82. Id. ¶ 15, 896 N.W.2d at 643. 
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pertinent information to a patient.”83  Nonetheless, the Court pointed to the 
2005 amendment of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-4684 as evidence that expert testimony 
is required in lack of informed consent cases, and must be used to establish 
“the medical risks, gravity and type of harm associated with each proce-
dure.”85  The majority held that expert testimony would also be required in 
an informed consent case because the procedures were outside the common 
knowledge of laypersons and the record did not establish the necessary ele-
ments as listed above.86  
B. SPECIFICALLY CONCURRING 
Justice McEvers agreed and signed with Justice Crothers’s majority 
opinion.87  Justice McEvers also filed a separate concurring opinion.88  Ac-
cording to her opinion, she wrote separately “to point out that it would have 
been helpful for the district court to address the issue of obvious occur-
rence.”89  In her concurrence, Justice McEvers agreed with the Dissent “that 
performing a different surgery than was identified on the consent form 
seem[ed] obvious,” but argued that the issue was not that simple.90  Justice 
McEvers argued that the medical terms used were not obvious to a layperson 
and, therefore, the “obvious occurrence” exception would not apply.91 
1. Justice McEvers Concurrence: Medical Terms for Procedures 
Are Beyond the Knowledge of a Layperson. 
In her concurrence, Justice McEvers focused on the need for expert opin-
ion in order to interpret and understand the medical terms used in Tong’s 
Answer to the Cartwrights’ Complaint and medical records submitted by 
Tong in support of her answer.92  In her answer, Tong had admitted perform-
ing “a bilateral salpingectomy, also known as a tubal ligation.”93  The sub-
mitted medical records describing the surgery referred to both “completion 
 
83. Id. (quoting Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 2002 ND 1, ¶ 13, 638 N.W.2d 1; and Fortier v. Traynor, 
330 N.W.2d 513, 517 (N.D. 1983)). 
84. The 2005 amendment removed “alleged lack of informed consent” from the list of obvious 
occurrence exceptions to N.D.C.C. §28-01-46. Id.  
85. Cartwright, ¶¶ 16-17, 896 N.W.2d at 643-644. 
86. Id. ¶ 17, 896 N.W.2d at 644. 
87. Id. ¶ 26, 896 N.W.2d at 645. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. ¶ 27, 896 N.W.2d at 645. 
91. Cartwright, ¶ 28, 896 N.W.2d at 645. 
92. Id. 
93. Id.  
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of the tubal ligation” and “completion of the salpingectomy.”94  Justice 
McEvers stated that the terms (“tubal ligation” and “salpingectomy”) were 
medical terms for procedures not within the knowledge of a layperson and 
“[w]hether the terms . . . [were] used interchangeably to describe tubal steri-
lization [was] . . . beyond the knowledge of a layperson.”95 
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Sitting in place of Justice Kapsner, District Judge Herauf wrote the dis-
sent.96  District Judge Herauf argued that the obvious occurrence exception 
did apply to the case.97  While the majority admitted it was obvious Dr. Tong 
had performed a different surgery than the one Roxane had originally con-
sented to, it found it was not obvious what had led Dr. Tong to perform a 
different procedure (and that was what would need to be explained by an 
expert).98  The dissent disagreed, claiming that it was obvious the surgery 
performed was different and the negligence was therefore obvious.99  The 
dissent further disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statute, ar-
guing that an “obvious occurrence” establishes a prima facie case on its 
own.100 
1. Both the Result and Procedure Performed Were Obviously 
Wrong 
The dissent looked at a recent case, decided within three months101 of 
Cartwright, Greene v. Matthys, to distinguish an obvious occurrence from an 
obvious result.102  In Greene, the Court had just held that the obvious occur-
rence exception could only apply if “the occurrence that led to the result, not 
the result itself” was obvious.103  The plaintiff in Greene had come out of hip 
surgery with one leg two inches longer than the other.104  There, the result 
 
94. Id.  
95. Id. 
96. Id. ¶¶ 25, 30, 896 N.W.2d at 645. (Chief Justice VandeWalle also signed the opinion. The 
Honorable William Herauf, D.J., sitting in place of Kapsner, J., disqualified).  
97. Cartwright, 2017 ND 146, ¶ 30, 896 N.W.2d at 646.  
98. Id. ¶ 14, 896 N.W.2d at 643. 
99. Id. ¶ 33, 896 N.W.2d at 646. 
100. Id. ¶ 36, 896 N.W.2d at 647. 
101. Cartwright was filed on June 13, 2017, while Greene was filed April 25, 2017. See Cart-
wright, 2017 ND 146, 896 N.W.2d 638; Greene v. Matthys, 2017 ND 107, 893 N.W.2d 179. 
102. Cartwright, 2017 ND 146, ¶ 32, 896 N.W.2d at 646. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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(different leg lengths) was obvious, but what had led to the different leg 
lengths during the technical surgical procedure, was not obvious.105 
Here, the dissent claimed, it was obvious what led to the result (removed 
fallopian tubes rather than severed fallopian tubes), and that was that Dr. 
Tong performed an unconsented to surgical procedure rather than the one that 
was planned.106  District Judge Herauf did not think it was necessary that 
plaintiffs “show there [were] no possible inferences that the reason why the 
doctor performed the wrong procedure . . . was a result of professional judg-
ment” in order to claim the obvious occurrence exception.107 
2. It is Wrong to Require Evidence of an Obvious Occurrence 
When the Obvious Occurrence itself is Meant to 
Negate the Need for Evidence of Negligence 
In his dissent, District Judge Herauf questioned what the majority would 
require an expert witness to actually show in this case.108  The dissent disa-
greed with the notion that Plaintiffs would be required to show the results of 
the two procedures, including the permanence and likelihood of being able 
to reverse one over the other.109  According to District Judge Herauf, the ma-
jority essentially requires a medical expert to prove a plaintiff doesn’t require 
a medical expert, and is in conflict with the statute that indicates an expert is 
not needed if one of the exceptions applies.110 
In a similar vein, the dissent did not feel Plaintiffs would need to prove 
“there was no possible medical reason for Tong to remove Cartwright’s fal-
lopian tubes, rather than sever them.”111  Again, when the “obvious occur-
rence” exception listed in the statute applies, a prima facie case is established 
without the need for evidence for each and every element.112  With a prima 
facie case established via an “obvious occurrence,” the case would continue 
to trial and Tong would then have the ability to rebut the Cartwrights’ case 
with other evidence.113 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Cartwright, ¶ 35, 896 N.W.2d at 646. 
109. Id. at 646-647. 
110. Id. at 647. 
111. Id. ¶ 36. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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IV. IMPACT OF DECISION 
Cartwright has arguably created more difficulties in understanding the 
“other obvious occurrence” exception of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.  The many 
perspectives on what constituted the occurrence in this case raises the need 
to develop a standard so that attorneys can accurately assess whether the oc-
currence may be found obvious by the court.  Further, the technical surgical 
procedure reference in this case was used too broadly to make it a good guide-
line for determining whether a case involves an obvious occurrence.  As it 
stands, Cartwright has made it difficult for attorneys to determine whether 
an obvious occurrence exists, and all but impossible for attorneys to use the 
exception in any case involving surgical procedures, no matter the context.  
A. CARTWRIGHT DOES NOT PROVIDE A METHOD FOR DETERMINING 
WHAT THE “OCCURRENCE” IS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CASES 
To determine whether there is an obvious occurrence, it is necessary to 
determine what the ‘occurrence’ actually is.  In previous cases and this case, 
the Court has stated that the occurrence is not the bad result, but what causes 
the resulting injury or damage.114  However, in Cartwright, there were vary-
ing opinions as to what the occurrence was that led to the removal of Cart-
wright’s fallopian tubes.  Appellant said the occurrence was Tong’s decision 
to expand the scope of Cartwright’s consent.115  The Dissent viewed the per-
formance of the wrong procedure as the occurrence.116  The Majority argued 
that the occurrence would be whatever led Tong to performing the wrong 
procedure.117  
Any of these occurrences would result in Cartwright’s fallopian tubes 
being removed.  The problem is that, depending on the viewpoint of what the 
occurrence actually is, the “obviousness” of it will be affected. If the occur-
rence was Tong’s decision to expand the scope of Cartwright’s consent, ex-
pert testimony would not likely be required.118  Additionally, if the occur-
rence was the performance of the wrong surgery, as the Dissent argued, it is 
 
114. See Greene, 2017 ND 107, ¶ 14, 893 N.W.2d at 184. 
115. Oral Argument at 16:16, Cartwright, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 20160293), 
http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/docket/20160293.htm. 
116. Cartwright, 2017 ND 146, ¶ 33, 896 N.W.2d at 646. 
117. Id. ¶ 14, 896 N.W.2d at 643. 
118. Some of the disputed issues were whether Cartwright consented to the salpingectomy and 
whether Tong had told Cartwright she would not perform a bilateral salpingectomy. Id.; see also 
Oral Argument at 24:07, Cartwright, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 20160293), 
http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/docket/20160293.htm (stating that an expert could not testify as to 
whether Tong told Cartwright she would not perform a bilateral salpingectomy). 
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clear this could have been found to be an obvious occurrence.119  The Major-
ity ultimately decided the occurrence was what had led Tong to perform the 
wrong procedure, and that this occurrence was not obvious because there was 
no reason provided by Tong.120  
Cartwright makes clear the importance of determining what the actual 
occurrence is prior to relying on the obvious occurrence exception to 
N.D.C.C § 28-01-46.  From this case, it is not clear whether the Court will 
take into account the specific way the plaintiff frames the case.  If it is within 
the Court’s discretion, it would be helpful if a more specific guideline could 
be provided.  Otherwise, attorneys face the risk of deciding an occurrence is 
obvious only to have their entire case changed by the Court’s differing view-
point.  
B. LABELING ANY CASE INVOLVING “TECHNICAL SURGICAL 
PROCEDURES” AS BEYOND THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
LAYPERSONS MAY BE TOO BROAD 
Although Cartwright followed precedent in holding that expert testi-
mony is necessary where technical surgical procedures are outside the com-
mon knowledge of laypersons,121 the Court’s expanded application of this 
guideline may render the exceptions found in North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-01-46 moot.  Though Cartwright involved the technical proce-
dures of tubal ligation and bilateral salpingectomy, the point of expert testi-
mony in such cases is to show that the doctor’s surgical technique was defec-
tive in some way.122  There is a difference “between cases involving the 
merits of a diagnosis and scientific treatment and cases where, during the 
performance of surgical or other skilled operations an ulterior act or omission 
occurs, the judgment of which does not require scientific opinion to throw 
light upon the subject.”123  
As stated before, if the occurrence here was that Tong negligently ex-
panded the scope of the consent, it is arguable that this is an ordinary fact 
question.  Medical records showed that Cartwright had signed a consent form 
for a tubal ligation, and a bilateral salpingectomy was performed.124  During 
 
119. Cartwright, ¶ 14, 896 N.W.2d at 634 (majority opinion stating it was obvious Tong per-
formed a different surgery than was allegedly consented to).  
120. Tong did not allege she had a medical reason to perform a different procedure. Id. ¶ 36, 
896 N.W.2d at 647. Also, the medical records stated there were not any complications. Brief of 
Appellants, supra note 1, at ¶ 16. 
121. See Cartwright, ¶ 17, 896 N.W.2d at 644. 
122. See generally Ellefson v. Earnshaw, 499 N.W.2d 112, 113 (N.D. 1993). 
123. SPEISER, supra note 33. 
124. Cartwright, ¶ 2, 896 N.W.2d at 640. 
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the oral argument, one of the Justices made the point that an expert could not 
testify as to what Tong told Cartwright (that she would not perform a bilateral 
salpingectomy).125  Therefore, these may have been questions for the jury, 
involving no need for expert testimony.  Given the lack of analysis separating 
technical and medical questions from ordinary fact questions, it may be dif-
ficult for attorneys and their clients to predict how the Court will frame cases 
involving technical surgical procedures.  
Furthermore, precluding cases from the obvious occurrence exception 
because they involve technical surgical procedures risks direct conflict with 
N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.  For example, hip surgery is a complex technical sur-
gical procedure that requires expert testimony.126  Nonetheless, if the hip sur-
gery is performed on the wrong patient, it is an obvious occurrence and does 
not require expert testimony.127  Applied too broadly, the general rule that 
expert testimony is required in cases involving technical procedures would 
require expert testimony for cases expressly designated as obvious occur-
rences.128  Though the application of this rule did not go so far in this case, 
Cartwright raises the possible problems that would stem from such a broad 
guideline.  
V. CONCLUSION  
In Cartwright v. Tong, the North Dakota Supreme Court focused on the 
interpretation of a difficult area of North Dakota law: the obvious occurrence 
exception to the state’s expert affidavit statute.  However, the analysis offered 
in the opinion may raise more issues with this provision than it solves.  
Through this case, it has become clear that even the “occurrence” can be in 
dispute, which complicates an attorney’s ability to assess whether such oc-
currence is obvious.  Additionally, the Court’s failure to distinguish between 
technical issues and ordinary questions of fact was arguably a missed oppor-
tunity to allow for more understanding of this area of law, and may prevent 
such distinctions in the future.  Moreover, by broadly excluding obvious oc-
currences from cases involving technical surgical procedures, the Court risks 
interfering with the actual statutory provisions explicitly deeming medical 
 
125. Oral Argument at 24:07, Cartwright, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 20160293), 
http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/docket/20160293.htm. 
126. See Greene v. Matthys, 2017 ND 107, ¶¶ 13-14, 893 N.W.2d 179, 183-184.  
127. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2017). 
128. During the oral argument, one of the Justices noted that the assumption would be laypeo-
ple do not understand how most surgeries work, and concluded it could be said that an expert would 
be required in obvious cases to say, for example, how you would remove the left arm as opposed to 
the right arm. Oral Argument at 30:37, Cartwright, 896 N.W.2d 638 (No. 20160293), 
http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/docket/20160293.htm. 
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procedures with certain results obvious occurrences.  Overall, Cartwright 
brings to light certain issues with the obvious occurrence exception that may 
prompt cautious attorneys to obtain expert affidavits in all medical malprac-
tice cases.  Via footnote, the Court also hints that it may be a good idea to 
carefully consider how such a case should be framed, as “medical battery” 
may have allowed the plaintiff to avoid such issues.  
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